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ABSTRACT: Traditionally, education has been theorized as existing within a binary system—education in 
the sciences and education in the humanities. If education in design can be viewed as a third culture within 
this realm then it will have teachers that teach design, students that learn design, and mechanisms in place 
to insure that the teaching and learning of design occur. Resultantly, one must ask: What does it mean to 
know as a designer? This question is one of epistemic significance, and, as such, begins to create the basis 
of a framework for design knowledge and design education. What, in a newly categorized third culture, can 
establish such an epistemic foundation; are the epistemic models available in the sciences and humanities 
appropriate for design education? How can education in design both situate itself in relation to the sciences 
and the humanities while providing for an epistemic foundation that allows for design knowing, design 
teaching, and design learning? 
 
It is the intention of this paper to explore a qualitative and philosophical inquiry that positions design 
education; a position that interrogates a two-culture epistemology of education and begins to allow for a third 
culture whose knowledge is founded upon its own epistemic authority. This positionality will be addressed by 
exploring design education in relation to traditional education, outlining and engaging the problematic 
assumptions of the historical emergence of design education, and then proposing a return to the virtues of 
durability, utility, and beauty as proposed by Vitruvius in his foundational text De Architectura (1st Century 
BC). This return to Vitruvian virtue re-theorizes a design epistemology—and; therefore, a design 
education—that is once again grounded in the material, the contextual, and the experiential. By way of this 
Vitruvian re-visioning—a re-visioning that positions design education firmly within a pragmatic and material 
world—the content of that education is expunged from the store of tradition and made available to all 
learners through the uniqueness and complexity of individually lived experience. 
 








Traditionally, education has been theorized as consisting of two distinct areas, two educational cultures with 
fundamentally different interests. These areas, broadly defined, are education in the sciences and education 
in the humanities. Nigel Cross argues that this ‘two culture’ binary has had significant influence upon “our 
social, cultural, and educational systems” (Cross 2006, 01). Further, he theorizes a third culture, education 
in design, that might act to validate what Bruce Archer noted as “the collected experience of the material 
culture, and the collected body of experience, skill, and understanding embodied in the arts of planning, 
inventing, making and doing” (Cross 2006, 01). This material culture is grounded in technology; the 
“synthesis of knowledge and skills from both the sciences and the humanities, in pursuit of practical tasks” 
(Cross 2006, 02). It is an education grounded in materiality, locatedness, and specificity that is arrived at 
through ambiguity and idiosyncrasy, as well as practicality and appropriateness. 
 
It is the intention of this paper to explore a qualitative and philosophical inquiry that positions design 
education; a position that interrogates a two-culture epistemology of education and begins to allow for a third 
culture whose knowledge is founded upon its own epistemic authority. In theorizing this third culture, design 
education becomes a category of education that stands in contrast to the binary categories of science 
education and humanities education. Perhaps this position might best be viewed as a middle ground; an 
educational discipline that draws from both the humanities and the sciences without being fully subsumed by 
either. 
 
If design can be viewed as a third culture within the realm of education, then it must have educational goals. 
As a category of education, it is implied that design education will have teachers that teach design, students 
that learn design, and mechanisms in place to insure that the teaching and learning of design occur. Viewed 
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from this standpoint, education in design becomes a question of knowing; a question of epistemic 
significance, and, as such, begins to create the basis of a framework for design knowledge and design 
education. In a newly categorized third culture, a new epistemic foundation must be established; the 
epistemic models available in the sciences and humanities do not appear appropriate for design education. 
Education in design must situate itself in relation to the sciences and the humanities while providing for an 
epistemic foundation that allows for design knowing, design teaching, and design learning. Theorizing such 
an epistemic foundation requires situating design education within the traditional binary system, exploring 
historical documents that indicate the knowledge base necessary for designers, understanding 
contemporary theories of ‘design science,’ and then turning to a philosophical relativism that might provide a 
disciplinary veracity to design epistemology. 
 
 
1.0 EDUCATION AND KNOWLEDGE 
 
1.1  Traditional educational practice 
One means of understanding education in design as different from education in both the humanities and the 
sciences is to view them in relation to the aim of education in a more general sense. According to John 
Dewey, the aim of education in traditional systems consists in transferring “bodies of information and of skills 
that have been worked out in the past; therefore, the chief business of the school is to transmit them to the 
new generation” and to form habits in students that conform to past “developed standards and rules of 
conduct” (Dewey 1997, 17). Dewey’s delineation of the aims of traditional education might be simplified to 
consist of transmitting knowledge about particular phenomenon, acquiring skills in appropriate methods of 
enquiry, and inculcation in particular values. Cross employs these three criteria to begin the process of 
situating design education in relation to the existing cultures of science and humanities educational practice 
(Cross 2006). 
 
1.2  Knowledge assumptions 
According to Cross, the knowledge basis of each of the three cultures—science, humanities, and design—
are, respectively, the natural world, human experience, and the artificial world. Methods of enquiry for these 
cultures consist of: in the sciences: experimentation, classification, and analysis; in the humanities: analogy, 
metaphor, and evaluation; in design: modeling, pattern-formation, and synthesis. The values expressed by 
each culture include objectivity, rationality, neutrality, and a quest for ‘truth’ in the sciences; subjectivity, 
imagination, commitment, and a concern for ‘justice’ in the humanities; and practicality, ingenuity, empathy, 
and a concern for ‘appropriateness’ in design education (Cross 2006). 
 
Given the binary nature established by the traditional two-culture conception of education—and the dualism 
established in their explication—it appears that these systems are grounded in what Carolyn Korsmeyer 
would term patriarchal assumptions; assumptions bounded within established gender binaries (Korsmeyer 
2004). The dualism present within these gendered and binary assumptions can readily be critiqued through 
Korsmeyer’s concept of deep gender, a concept that critiques mainstream viewpoints based upon a deeply 
embedded juxtaposition of the gender concepts of masculinity and femininity. Further, the third culture of 
education in design might be viewed as having a relation to Lorraine Code’s establishment of an epistemic 
middle ground that does not privilege mainstream models of epistemic knowing. Code’s work in feminist 
theories of knowledge construction, her call for a mitigated relativism, might perhaps provide the epistemic 
foundation for design knowing and design education. 
 
 
2.0 DESIGN KNOWING 
 
2.1  On Architecture 
Prior to theorizing an epistemic foundation for education in design, it is beneficial to explore the question: 
What should designers know? This question might appear extremely far-reaching; however, the foundations 
of this question can be traced to one historical document. In the first century before Christ, Marcus Vitruvius 
Pollio composed De architectura—On Architecture—a text that has influenced over two millennia of design 
education and practice (Tavernor 2009). Vitruvius was a military architect and engineer serving in the 
Roman Legion under Julius Caesar and this volume was devoted to Augustus and conceived of to provide 
“recommendations so that by examining them, you yourself may become familiar with the characteristics of 
buildings already constructed and of those which will be built; in these books I have laid out all the principles 
of the discipline” (On Architecture, Book I, Introduction, 3). As this treatise also contains detailed accounts of 
technologies and other machines, it can be assumed that the term architecture for Vitruvius included all 
design fields—those dealing with the practical and appropriate creation of the artificial world. Vitruvius noted 
that “Architecture has three divisions; the construction of buildings, of sundials, and of machines” (On 
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Architecture, Book I, Chapter III, 1). As such, De architectura can be positioned as the first text concerning 
the discipline of design; the first document that designates what designers should know. 
 
As a disciplinary study, there are many fields that Vitruvius holds central to a designer’s understanding. “He 
should have a literary education, be skillful in drawing, knowledgeable about geometry and familiar with a 
great number of historical works, and should have followed lectures in philosophy attentively; he should 
have a knowledge of music, should not be ignorant of medicine, should know the judgments of jurists and 
have a command of astronomy and of the celestial system” (On Architecture, Book I, Chapter I, 3). Vitruvius 
spends the rest of the chapter in explaining the reasons that an architect must have an education in these 
particular areas of knowledge; without this “wide literary and technical knowledge” they could not have 
“reached the highest sanctuary of architecture” (On Architecture, Book I, Chapter I, 11). Vitruvius’ ‘wide 
literary and technical knowledge’ appears to cohere to the knowledge associated with both education in the 
humanities and education in the sciences. “The architect’s professional knowledge is enriched by 
contributions from many disciplines and fields of knowledge… this expertise derives from theory and 
practice” (On Architecture, Book I, Chapter I, 1).   
 
There is, of course, no direct correlation to the contemporary conception of education in design other than 
the assertion that the designer must have a wide knowledge of both the sciences and the humanities. One 
might; however, interpret Vitruvius’ assertion that all buildings—including all constructed technologies—
“must be executed in such a way as to take account of durability, utility, and beauty” (On Architecture, Book 
I, Chapter III, 2) as the foundational conditions of design. The Vitruvian virtues of durability, utility, and 
beauty begin to differentiate design knowing from knowing in the sciences and humanities; these conditions 
of design position the discipline within a material world where the pragmatic awareness of the 
appropriateness of particular materials define the durability of things made, the function of those things—
how they are used by humans—are conditions of their utility, and the particular aesthetic value we place on 
those items define their beauty.  In Vitruvius’ triad of design conditions—a material, practical, aesthetic, and 
located relativism—can be found the foundation for a contemporary design epistemology. It is now critical to 
explore why the epistemic value of Vitruvius’ assertions has not remained the primary concern of knowing in 
design education. 
 
2.2  The rise of Positivism 
Vitruvius’ treatise, considered as a nascent design epistemology—one which we might define as 
establishing both design education and practice—has not maintained its epistemic authority. The influence 
of his work can be traced through the Renaissance works and writings of Leon Battista Alberti and Andrea 
Palladio, the works of Sebastiano Serlio for the French monarchy, the seventeenth century works of Inigo 
Jones in England, and Thomas Jefferson’s University of Virginia. It wasn’t until 1792, that architectural 
education began to question the authority of Vitruvius. At this time, under the auspices of Jean-Nicolas-Louis 
Durand, architectural education at the École Polytechnique was “organized to create scientists and 
technicians with specialized skills” (Tavernor 2009, xxxiii). 
 
This shift away from a practically and materially located understanding of design cohered to the shift toward 
rational understanding typical of late Enlightenment thought. The logic of mathematics, the technologies of 
building, and a belief in humankind’s authority over the natural world began to assert more influence on 
design education than the Vitruvian call for durability, utility, and beauty. As a result of this shift, architectural 
expression, architectural practice, and architectural education became “the servant of a new kind of 
rationality and science” (Tavernor 2009, xxxiv). The practical, material, appropriate, human world of design 
became subservient to the objectivist rationality of scientific epistemology. The project of Modernity 
abandoned the Vitruvian ideal in favor of a positivist universalism coherent with the belief systems 
established in scientific ways of knowing. 
 
This positivist understanding of design knowing continued into the early twentieth century. Theo van 
Doesburg noted that “Our epoch is hostile to every subjective speculation in art, science, technology, etc.  
The new spirit, which already governs almost all modern life, is opposed to animal spontaneity, to nature’s 
domination, to artistic flummery. In order to construct a new object we need a method, that is to say, an 
objective system” (Cross 2006, 95). Six years later, Le Corbusier fully objectified the house as a “machine 
for living”; “The use of the house consists of a regular sequence of definite functions. The regular sequence 
of these functions is a traffic phenomenon. To render that traffic exact, economical and rapid is the key effort 
of modern architectural science” (Cross 2006, 95). 
 
The sensual world of embodied humanity was replaced with the efficiency of the rationality of architecture in 
the machine age. These early attempts to transform design into a scientific project were continued in the 
design methods movements of the 1960’s. According to Cross, “the desire of the new movement was even 
Re-visioning Design Education: A Third Culture Epistemology 
by Thomas J. Cline 
 
276 ARCC 2013 | The Visibility of Research 
Pedagogy: New Visions and Revisions in Architectural Education 
more strongly than before to base design process (as well as the products of design) on objectivity and 
rationality” (Cross 2006, 95). The design methods movement reached its peak when Herbert Simon called 
for the development of “a science of design… a body of intellectually tough, analytic, partly formalizable, 
partly empirical, teachable doctrine about the design process” (Cross 2006, 96). 
 
 
2.3  Critique of Positivist design 
Simultaneous to the peak of the design methods movement, there was a critical interrogation of its scientific 
bias. Christopher Alexander rejected his earlier works on rational methods of design noting that the fields 
differed in that “scientists try to identify the components of existing structures, designers try to shape the 
components of new structures” (Cross 2006, 97). There was also a rising awareness that comparisons 
between science and design had been simplified and that there was, perhaps, more complexity in the 
distinctions between these two methodological endeavors than first assumed. Many thought that “perhaps 
there was not so much for design to learn from science after all, and rather that perhaps science had 
something to learn from design” (Cross 2006, 97). Cross further explicates this position when he notes that 
designers have “been seduced by the lure of Wissenschaft, and turned away from the lore of Technik; they 
have defected to the cultures of scientific and scholarly enquiry, instead of developing the culture of 
designerly enquiry” (Cross 2006, 06). A culture of designerly enquiry might be thought of as a middle ground 
culture based upon the disciplinary conditions articulated by Vitruvius—durability, utility, and beauty. 
 
Contemporary interrogations of a design methodology founded upon scientific principles—on scientific ways 
of knowing and the romanticization of science as a paradigm for human life—have led to a destabilization of 
design knowing, and consequently, to design education. In light of this critique, I argue that it is not, perhaps, 
a science of design but, rather, an epistemological foundation of design that is necessary. In asking what we 
know and how we know as designers, we may be able to understand and justify approaches to how we 
teach design. An epistemology of design should lead to a more robust understanding of what it means to 
know as a designer and thus offer up theories and practices that insure the disciplinary veracity of design 
education; that insure that design education is substantially differentiated from educational practices in both 
the sciences and the humanities.   
 
 
3.0  BINARY KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS 
 
3.1  Binary systems and design epistemology 
One possible means to explicate an epistemology of design—of answering the question of what designers 
should know—is to turn to the feminist theories of Carolyn Korsmeyer and Lorraine Code. As noted above, 
the two-culture paradigm of education—the idea that education has two distinct areas of focus; education in 
the sciences and education in the humanities—allows a critique based upon the gender asymmetries 
illuminated in Korsmeyer’s concept of deep gender. In the sense that Korsmeyer uses the term, deep 
gender is a predominantly hidden system of value judgments that hinge upon “oppositional concepts and 
schemes of value whose meanings fluctuate in different historical and cultural contexts” (Korsmeyer 2004, 
03). The sciences and the humanities might be seen as such oppositional concepts. These oppositions can 
be associated with the binary opposition of the culturally determined deeply gendered terms masculine and 
feminine. This cultured gender binary of masculine/feminine is associated with the intellectual binary of 
mind/body dualism that is at the heart of contemporary scientific epistemology. 
 
3.2  Gender heirarchy and epistemic value 
Within Korsmeyer’s deep gender analysis, the privileged and dominant binary masculine is associated with 
the Cartesian mind, and further, with rationality, knowledge, idealism, abstraction, and countless other 
seemingly neutral identifiers. For purposes of this analysis, education in the sciences seemingly coheres 
to—and should be considered congruent with—the masculine binary. In opposition to this privilege, the 
subordinate feminine binary is associated with the Cartesian body, with emotion, experience, pragmatism, 
materiality, and additional identifiers opposite those in the dominant category. Here, the subordinate binary 
to the sciences, the humanities, should be considered congruent to the subordinate feminine. In utilizing the 
gender categorization of these binary pairs, Korsmeyer holds that deep gender analysis exposes what might 
otherwise be perceived of as neutral ideas, statements, beliefs, systems, and cultures. In recognition of 
these gendered binaries, there is potential to move beyond the non-neutral exclusivity of these categoricals 
and pursue ideas, beliefs, and systems that celebrate difference, specificity, and locatedness. 
 
It is within the oppositional values of these deep gender claims—claims identified within a hierarchy of 
dominant and subordinate—that Korsmeyer finds epistemic claims that support the continued oppression of 
women, other marginalized people, and ideas, beliefs, and epistemic systems that do not fall within the 
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dominant patriarchal category encapsulated under the conceptual binary masculine. Additionally, this 
patriarchally established hierarchy oppresses any additional viewpoints other than the two encapsulated 
under the binary masculine/feminine. The extreme dualism that defines the binary masculine/feminine, 
mind/body, and knowledge/experience—a binary system that excludes all that is ‘other’—appears, also, to 
encapsulate education in the sciences and education in the humanities and, as such, to exclude education 
in design as some thing ‘other’ to this binary pairing. The established binary viewpoint precludes all other 
viewpoints as meaningful to education; it precludes additional viewpoints from having epistemic worth.  It is 
perhaps Korsmeyer’s critique of the patriarchal assumptions deeply embedded within the two-culture binary 
of education that will provide room for a third culture—for education in design—and thus for an epistemology 
of design. Such an epistemology cannot be grounded within the dualism sciences/humanities, but must 
create its own ground for epistemic authority. 
 
 
4.0 THIRD CULTURE EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
4.1  Education’s third culture 
Employing Korsmeyer’s conception of deep gender to critique the exclusive position of a two culture 
educational system allows the possibility for a third culture in education—education in design. As this third 
culture is ‘other’ than the established sciences/humanities binary, it, necessarily, must establish its epistemic 
authority; it must answer the question regarding what designers know. It must claim a knowing that is not 
based upon an epistemology of science or an epistemology of humanities. This third culture might be viewed 
as having a relation to Lorraine Code’s establishment of an epistemic middle ground that does not privilege 
mainstream models of epistemic knowing. Code’s work in feminist theories of knowledge construction, her 
call for a mitigated relativism, might perhaps provide the epistemic foundation for design knowing and design 
education. 
 
4.2  Epistemological relativism 
Code describes epistemological relativism as a system that holds that “knowledge, truth, or even ‘reality’ can 
be understood only in relation to particular sets of cultural or social circumstances, to a theoretical 
framework, a specifiable range of perspectives, a conceptual scheme, or a form of life. Conditions of 
justification, criteria of truth and falsity, and standards of rationality are likewise relative: there is no universal 
unchanging framework or scheme for rational adjudication among competing knowledge claims” (Code 
1991, 02). In accepting this definition of epistemological relativism, it becomes obvious that the individual 
knower is of ultimate importance relative to what is known. To know, in this sense, is to have knowledge of; 
to experience in a particular way—particular to the individual knower. This particularity is essential to a third 
culture epistemology of design. 
 
From this position, Code begins to dismantle the priority given a masculine identity posing as scientific and 
epistemic neutrality. In forming this argument, Code also critiques the essentialism of positions that affirm 
distinct and stereotypical masculinities and femininities. These mainstream, deep gender binaries have a 
significant impact upon the epistemological warrantability of education in the sciences and education in the 
humanities. In Code’s critique of mainstream epistemology—one where the masculine/dominant objective 
epistemology of science subordinates the subjective epistemology of the humanities and completely 
excludes any other epistemic systems as unwarrantable—there is no expectation of a reversal of that 
epistemology, but rather, an expansion that recognizes subjective and other forms of knowledge for the 
individual and her beliefs, lived experiences, educational encounters, and practical knowledge about the 
world. This middle ground, pragmatist epistemology is, perhaps, the foundation of a design epistemology 
supporting, and supported by, Vitruvius’ conditions of durability, utility, and beauty. 
 
Code further clarifies her position when she differentiates between relativism and what might be perceived of 
as a radical subjectivism that could reasonably lead only to skepticism or solipsism. She accomplishes this 
task by showing that the relationship of the terms objective and subjective need not be polarized to the 
extent that they are irrevocably oppositional. To make this claim she employs both a critique of Aristotelian 
contradictories and culturally embedded dichotomies that “have structured mainstream Anglo-American 
epistemology” (Code 1991, 28). Contradictories—as exclusive and binary oppositions—exclude any room 
for a middle ground; there can be no knowledge that does not cohere to a stringent logic based upon 
principles of either/or. There are only two possibilities in an Aristotelian contradictory—possibility A or 
possibility not-A.  These possibilities cohere to the two culture system extant in education in the sciences 
and education in the humanities. Such systems exclude all subtleties and insure that variety and reciprocity 
have no epistemic authority. This formal logic does have value in knowledge construction; however, it 
remains firmly grounded in intellectual isolationism and does not express the reality of lived experience. In 
the majority of relations that we have with the existential world there are subtleties of understanding, of 
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judgment, and of knowledge that are predicated on the varieties of experiences, experiencers, and things 
experienced. In practical usage, contradictories “become instruments of oppression and social control” 
(Code 1991, 29). 
 
4.3  Individual epistemic authority 
Like Korsmeyer, Code is unwilling to accept a polarized subjectivism/objectivism and; therefore, advocates a 
form of relativism to justify the epistemic authority of the individual knower; a form of relativism that 
interrogates the masculine dominant and its claim of objectivity. Similarly, she must dismantle a polarized 
relativism if knowledge is to have any practical value.  Relativism is one half of the binary pair that includes 
universalism. In exploring the universalism/relativism binary, Code again finds a middle ground by 
advocating a tempered moral relativism based upon specific and particular relationships tempered by critical 
evaluation. She holds that any “values and regulative principles invoked are appropriately responsive to the 
context” (Code 1991, 108). Restated, any universal moral principle must be tempered by evaluation of the 
reality of the people, events, and circumstances being held in judgment. In this way, knowledge claims find 
space within the subtleties of experienced life—they are not relegated to the exclusion required of an 
oppressive binary system. In making these moves that exist between polarizing binaries, Code avoids 
claims of dehumanizing objectivism, disabling subjectivism and a slippage into unmitigated relativism. 
 
Code’s proposal to resituate epistemological inquiry by recognizing the value of context in knowing provides 
a possible means to overcome the polarized binaries and the positivist biases of mainstream epistemology. 
Mainstream positivism is best characterized as an inquiry dependent on the rationalization, simplification, 
categorization, and the necessity of universalizing all knowledge claims. It is the basis of western 
conceptions of natural science and, for the most part, constitutes the contemporary western worldview. This 
worldview presupposes a disconnect of humankind from the natural world—we are observers, manipulators, 
controllers of a system that we can only understand in categorical simples and non-complex relations. This 
viewpoint allows no tangible relation to the natural world; we have no tangible expression of being in the 
world. 
 
A Heideggerian approach to epistemic knowledge of the world may be one possible means of overturning 
the hegemony of reason for more sustainable relations with others, with nature, and with a future free of self-
imposed disaster. Code notes that a feminist convergence with phenomenological thought might “offer an 
account of being in the world which resonates with the activities of moral and epistemic subjects who know 
and understand by positioning and repositioning themselves within a situation in order to understand its 
implications and see in those implications contextualized, situated reasons for action” (Code 1991, 148). 
This move from the purity and universality of rationalism to a contextualized reasonableness allows for us to 
know in specific and particular ways, to make informed decisions based on our knowing, and to take 
practical actions to insure the furtherance of our being in the world. 
 
4.4  Epistemology of experience 
Code suggests that institutionalized, ‘public’ knowledge is a product of the positivist unity-of-science project 
and that this knowledge legitimates “the networks of authority and expertise that sustain asymmetrical, 
oppressive social and institutional power structures” (Code 1991, 175). Postmodernist/post-
structuralist/feminist thought has sought to combat the structures of ‘public’ knowledge by providing space 
for alternative authorities, alternative expertise. Seemingly, feminist thought has moved beyond awareness 
of the knowledge/power matrix of domination and toward dialogical systems that can allow for such 
alternatives. By employing Wittgenstein’s knowledge/acknowledge observation, Code hopes to create space 
where women can acknowledge their own expertise and, as such, alleviate dependence on experts who 
currently support the oppressive systems that leave women with no space of their own. This same 
methodology might empower an epistemology of design; dialogical systems that allow for alternative views, 
alternative solutions, and alternative ways of knowing. This epistemic system gains its authority from a 
practicality and groundedness in the messy complexity of lived experience. In this way, the 
knowledge/experience binary—a deeply gendered and oppressive/exclusionary construct—can be 
dismantled or, at least, re-boundaried in order to make room for a more flexible form of knowing; for a 
mitigated relativism that allows additional ways of knowing. 
 
Code’s call for a mitigated relativism seems appropriate to rescue the epistemic authority of women, 
designers, and other groups marginalized by mainstream epistemic practices that favor rationality and ideal 
objectivism. With a commitment to realism represented by an engagement with the material, particular, 
spatial, and temporal qualities of lived experience, coupled with a practicality grounded in personal 
responsibility and accountability, these groups can re-value knowledge through practice and place it in a 
preferential position in regard to all epistemic claims. This positionality in the real, in the appropriate, and in 
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the material acts to refute the authority and credibility of universalism, of oppositional binary systems, of 
ideal objectivity, and of subject-neutrality. 
 
Mainstream epistemological theory, with its universalizing character, must be re-conceptualized to a model 
that recognizes the necessity of addressing the knowledge claims of the practical, the particular, and the 
material as issues that make up our experiential lives. In opposition to the mainstream and a possible 
replacement feminist philosophy, Code advocates a middle ground that challenges any unified theory by 
being located within “experiences, histories, social structures, material circumstances” (Code 1991, 322). It 
is this locatedness that expresses the potential for re-conceptualization. In being located, in having 
positionality as a defining characteristic, this middle ground requires both mitigated relativism and 
accountability. Mitigated relativism allows a re-conceptualized epistemology to avoid the problems of a 
unified theory that precludes difference; accountability insures that the included difference of “Other-ness” 
becomes central to methodological control. 
 
Code’s middle ground allows for a pluralist epistemology. She notes that the “diversity of situations and 
circumstances in which people need to be in a position to know makes it difficult to see how a theory of 
knowledge, an epistemology, could respond to their questions” (Code 1991, 315). In allowing a middle 
ground—a pluralism—to general knowledge construction, specialized epistemologies can likewise be 
understood through a pluralist theory. Particularly, design knowing benefits from an awareness that unified 
theories of knowing are absolutist, authoritarian, and do not account for difference—ambiguities that are 
personal, spatial, material, and environmental. Stenstad’s anarchy celebrates the power of pluralist 
methodologies in noting that such methods insist upon “questioning, working and playing with ambiguities, 
being alert for the presence of the strange within the familiar, and allowing for concealment or unclarity in the 




A mitigated relativism that seeks the middle ground of pluralism, allows for knowledge questions that are 
grounded in particularity, that take “place from somewhere” and are “committed to finding answers that 
make action possible” (Code 1991, 319) is analogous to a pragmatist philosophy, one where things that 
“work”—that have particular grounding—are true. This mitigated relativism/pragmatism—readily associated 
with the Vitruvian virtues of durability, utility, and beauty—appears to be a necessary condition for any 
design epistemology. It allows for a multiplicity of solutions to ‘softly’ defined problems; it does not require 
universal stances or responses, but rather, for critical, particular, and evolving responses to continually 
changing needs and circumstances. 
 
Code’s mitigated relativism coupled with the Vitruvian virtues appear to be necessary conditions for design 
epistemology—a knowing that is informed by “experiences, histories, social structures, material 
circumstances” (Code 1991, 322). This re-visioned design epistemology mediates a positionality between 
lived experience and propositional knowledge. This positionality allows for design solutions that are 
particularly located—particular to clients, to site conditions, to economic constraints, and to material 
circumstances. It is this locatedness that limits universal theories and produces design solutions that 
respond to particular needs, places, and understandings. It, perhaps, allows for the idiosyncrasies of 
designers, of clients, and of circumstances. Additionally, the pluralism implied in questioning “a theory of 
knowledge, an epistemology” (Code 1991, 315) structures well within a framework of design knowing. 
Design processes cannot be defined by singular methodologies, by singular ways of knowing. A re-visioned 
middle ground may indeed provide a framework for articulating design knowing that avoids general 
evasiveness but still allows for an ambiguity necessary for approaching solution-based problems. Perhaps 
this middle ground thinking will, additionally, allow for the formation of a pedagogical model that celebrates 
the pragmatic, the subversive, the idiosyncratic, and the ambiguous without losing its way and slipping 
toward the extremes of either a dehumanizing scientific rationalism or what might be termed the pure 
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